The present invention relates to an anti-identity theft and information security system. More particularly, the invention relates to an anti-identity theft and information security system that requires positive identification through association of readable human biological information to facilitate the exchange of information, such as by requiring biometric information to activate an RFID tag before the RFID tag will transmit or receive information.
Identity theft is a form of stealing the identity of another person to assume that person's identity or to access resources of that person such as their financial information or other benefits. Needless to say, and unfortunately, identity theft is a growing problem in the United States and around the world. Obviously, an identity theft victim can suffer any one of a number of adverse consequences, including loss of rights, financial loss, loss of data or other information, and can even be held responsible for financial debts incurred or crimes committed by the perpetrator in the name of the victim. Oftentimes, sensitive and/or private electronic information is stolen or misappropriated through elaborate phishing schemes or other ploys designed to get users to inadvertently provide account information (e.g., username and/or password) or download and install malicious software to an electronic device used to store and/or transmit sensitive information. Additionally, financial institutions are particularly prone to data breaches as a result of malicious hackers vying to obtain sensitive financial information. It is oftentimes difficult, if not impossible, to secure lost information or other important documents once the information is misappropriated. Additionally, identity theft poses a major problem for national security as it increases the difficulty for law enforcement officials to properly identify criminals or for customs officials to stop terrorists from entering the country. This can be especially problematic at the border in view that the United States is now using RFID tags in passports to identify citizens entering and leaving the country.
Radio frequency identification (“RFID”) is a technology that uses radio waves to exchange information between an electronic tag attached to an object and a reader, for the purpose of identification and tracking. Some of the most common electronic tags are passive and powered by an interrogation signal emitted from the reader. The amount of information and the distance the reader can interrogate the RFID chip varies by technology. For example, some electronic tags can only be read from several feet, while other tags can be read from much farther distances (e.g., beyond a line of sight with the reader). Such RFID tags have been used in automotive vehicle identification, automatic toll systems, electronic license plates, electronic manifests, vehicle routing, vehicle performance monitoring, banking (e.g., electronic checkbooks, electronic credit cards, etc.), security (e.g., personal identification, automatic gates, surveillance, etc.) and in the medical profession (e.g., identification, patient history, etc.).
In recent years, RFID has been used more as a means of personal identification. One problem with this use is that RFID was not originally designed to authenticate human beings. Rather, RFID was developed as a means to track storage containers, packages, etc. As a result of using RFID in personal identification, concerns have been raised over security and privacy. For example, as mentioned above, the United States started issuing passports having RFID tags therein. One problem with this is that the data on an RFID chip or tag can be cloned. For instance, data from an RFID chip may be copied onto another chip or to a recordable medium using a relatively inexpensive card reader and laptop. This is particularly problematic because passport information may be stolen without the knowledge of the owner. For example, for passports mailed to the owner, it would no longer be necessary to open the package to copy the information. Rather than open the package, the passport information is obtained by a reader that communicates with the RFID chip through the package materials. Thus, the information can be stolen without damaging the package and without the recipient's knowledge.
As a result, using RFID in passports may actually make the information stored therein less secure. This is certainly a problem regarding both national security and privacy. With respect to privacy, identity thieves can obtain personal details such as name, nationality, sex, date and place of birth, and a digital photograph of the passport holder from embedded RFID chips that broadcast such information when queried. If the RFID enabled passport has no security features, that information may be freely available. With respect to national security, identity theft jeopardizes the accurate identification of U.S. nationals or others who may be of interest to the U.S. government. One way to combat such theft is that the United States government added a metallic “anti-skimming” material along the exterior of the passport as a security feature. The metallic material is designed to prevent data from being read from a distance—especially when the passport booklet is closed.
Another security problem associated with RFID is the illicit tracking of RFID tags. In this regard, the ability to read a tag containing personal identification information or other secure or private data poses a risk to privacy, not only for individuals who may be carrying RFID enabled passports, but also for merchandise throughout the supply chain and thereafter. For example, Electronic Product Codes (“EPC's”) embedded with RFID tags may easily be embedded in consumer products, such as electronics. Ideally, the EPC's are used in embedded RFID tags to track the products throughout the supply chain. But, without a secure means of controlling communication with the RFID tag, it may be relatively easy to illicitly track the product through the supply chain. Post purchase, these RFID tags may remain affixed to the products and may remain functional. Thus, it would be possible to deduce the location of the purchased product by simply scanning the RFID-enabled EPC tag. This can be particularly undesirable for the product owner. For example, a thief may simply identify products within a home by scanning the house with an RFID reader, in the event the RFID-enabled EPC tag remains active. Additionally, it may be possible to track the location of someone when the RFID-enabled tags are embedded in clothing.
One way to defend against data being stolen from an RFID chip or to prevent illicit tracking throughout the supply chain or post purchase is to use cryptography. For example, some tags use a “rolling code” scheme to enhance RFID tag security. Here, tag identification information changes after each scan to reduce the usefulness of observer responses. More sophisticated cryptographic devices engage in challenge-response authentications where the tag interacts with the reader. Here, secret tag information is never sent over an insecure communication channel between the tag and the reader. The tag and reader secure the channel when the reader issues a challenge to the tag, of which the tag responds with a result that is computed using a local cryptographic circuit key. The tag transmits the key back to the reader to complete the authentication cycle. The keys may be based on symmetric or public key cryptography.
One drawback of cryptographically-enabled tags is that they are typically more expensive and require more power than simpler equivalents. These drawbacks certainly limit the scope of potential deployment. As a result, some manufacturers developed RFID tags that use weaker or proprietary encryption schemes. Weaker encryption schemes are more susceptible to a sophisticated attack. One example of such an RFID tag is the Exxon-Mobil Speedpass, which uses a proprietary cryptographically-enabled tag manufactured by Texas Instruments to execute a challenge-response authentication at a lower cost. Another drawback of such challenge-response algorithms is that the RFID tags typically fail to have computational resources to process the cryptographic authentications without a significant cost increase associated thereto.
Another security measure designed to prevent information from being stolen from RFID tags is to shield the data stored on the RFID tag from an interrogation request from a reader. For example, sleeves or holders generally made from aluminum are designed to prevent reading information from an RFID chip. In this regard, the aluminum shield creates a Faraday cage to prevent the transmission of information to and/or from the RFID chip. The true effectiveness of this technology is unknown as it is still experimental. But, the shielding is thought to be at least partially dependent on the RFID tag. For example, low-frequency RFID tags (e.g., human or animal implantable tags) are relatively resistant to shielding while higher-frequency RFID tags (e.g., 13.56 MHz smart cards and access badges) are somewhat sensitive to shielding and tend to be difficult to read when within a few inches of a metal surface. One concern is that if the metal/aluminum is not completely effective at preventing transmission of sensitive data to and/or from the RFID chip, it may still be easy to obtain access to private information stored on the chip.
Moreover, some prior art references have disclosed certain systems and methods for using biometrics in association with RFID for security purposes. In one example, U.S. Publication No. 2006/0170530 to Nwosu discloses a system and method for fingerprint-based authentication using RFID. More specifically, Nwosu discloses a system for enabling individuals to control the access and storage of biometric attributes required for identity authentication, before being able to execute a financial transaction or the like. In this system, a smart device (e.g., a smartphone or the like) is in communication with a host application on a computer or an RFID reader. The smart device retains encrypted data regarding the biometrics of the authenticated user and can communicate that information to either the host application or the RFID reader. The user scans its biometric information into the smart device via a biometric scanner for comparison against stored and authenticated biometric data. The smart device goes through a verification cycle to match and authenticate the user operating the smart device. An RFID reader may be in wireless communication with the smart device and by wire-line communication with a computer for reading the authentication result from the smart device. Upon authentication, the user is allowed to complete a financial transaction using the smart device.
What the Nwosu publication fails to disclose is a means for completing an RFID tag circuit keyed to a unique fingerprint. In this respect, while Nwosu discloses the use of a fingerprint scanner, said scanner is not in the form of an RFID tag that includes a circuit keyed only to the unique fingerprint of the smart device user. The Nwosu device, therefore, has two readily apparent drawbacks: first, replication of the fingerprint against the scanner is far easier than with said keyed circuit. In this respect, the scanner merely needs to read the fingerprint pattern in two-dimensional form, as opposed to reading the three-dimensional aspects of the user's fingerprint. Second, Nwosu cannot terminate RFID activation when the finger is removed from the RFID circuit. The problem here is that the fingerprint scanner does not require interaction with the user's finger—rather, it only requires a one-time scan to obtain the fingerprint. This particular drawback could expose the smart device to a security breach should the smart device be authenticated and lost. The system disclosed herein alleviates this issue, as discussed in detail below, by requiring authenticated and continued coupling of the RFID chip with a fingerprint. Nwosu does not actually activate/deactivate the RFID tag through physical interaction with a fingerprint, but rather through software instruction once the smart device reads a fingerprint with another scanner. Security of the smart device in Nwosu does not rely on local authentication of the physical communication circuits; but rather it is reliant on known methods for two-dimensional fingerprint scanning.
Other references known in the prior art include U.S. Publication No. 2007/0200681 to Colby, which generally discloses an identity device that includes a switchable RFID tag for use with identity documents such as passports, driver's licenses, financial (transaction) cards such as credit or debit cards, remote controls, security devices, access devices, communication devices, or the like. The “switchable” aspect of Colby refers to changing the operation of an RFID tag from a responsive state to a non-responsive state; or to change the operation of an RFID tag from one responsive state to another responsive state, such as from a data entry state (e.g., programming state) to an external device control state (e.g., a remote). In this respect, the Colby RFID tag operates like RFID tags known in the art—it uses energy emitted from a reader to change some aspect of the tag itself. Colby does not disclose, however, the ability for the tag to redirect the energy captured from the external reader outside of the RFID tag, e.g., to power “on” or power “off” the electronic device (e.g., a smartphone) to which the RFID tag is coupled. In terms of inventory and tracking, Colby is particularly deficient in this respect.
Additionally, U.S. Publication No. 2009/0102606 to Kim discloses a method for authenticating an RFID tag by means of using a rotating synchronization scheme between the tag and reader, but fails to disclose synchronization of an electronic device (e.g., a database) with the product carrying the RFID tag. The problem with Kim is that the synchronization occurs between the RFID tag and reader, as opposed to between the electronic device and product. This is critical in terms of proper identification and tracking of the product because the RFID tag could be removed from the product yet still synchronize with the reader. The product itself, i.e., the item being tracked, is otherwise lost because it is no longer attached to the RFID tag. So, the obvious drawback in Kim is that the product could be disassociated with the RFID tag and the synchronization and tracking system disclosed therein would have no way of knowing this occurred.
Thus, there exists a significant need for an anti-identity theft and information security system designed to prevent illicitly obtaining sensitive information by, for example, tracking and/or cloning information on an RFID chip. Such an anti-identity theft and information security system, especially when used in association with passports and credit cards, should make use of unique biological information to secure the information stored and transmitted therewith. In this regard, the transmission authentication should be used in association with a fingerprint or iris scan that prevents activation of the data stored on the transmitting device if the individual owning the passport or the credit card, or associated authorized users, are not present at the time the transmitting device is queried for access. The fingerprint and/or iris scan verifies that the user has the authority to use the information on the transmitting device for its intended purpose. The transmitting device will not otherwise activate without such continued authentication. The present invention fulfills these needs and provides further related advantages.